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NOTES
The Privacy Expectation: A Comparison
of Federal and California Constitutional
Standards for Drug Testing in
Amateur Athletics
Introduction
The nation's concern with the drug problem increases daily with
each new story recounting a tragedy directly related to drug abuse.1
Whether it is the death of an addict in an inner-city slum or the passing
of a middle-class American who just wanted to "see what it is like," the
drug abuse problem in the United States grows with its list of victims.
The problem reaches much further, however, than the simple causal con-
nection between overdose and death. The drug problem touches the lives
of those who deal with drug users, and even extends to dealings with
foreign countries. Consider the death of Drug Enforcement Agent En-
rique "Kiki" Camarena, murdered while working in Mexico to stem the
massive flow of illegal drugs across the border.2 The blatant abduction,
torture, and murder of a United States law enforcement agent on foreign
soil is unprecedented,3 and demonstrates both how lucrative the black
market for regulated or illegal drugs has become and to what lengths
those involved will go to preserve the drug trade.4
The fear that drug use compromises the integrity of everything from
our work to our play has led to attempts to implement drug testing pro-
grams in many areas of American life.5 Particular attention concerning
1. For example, two tragedies directly related to the drug problem in America are the
death of Benji Ramirez, possibly the first death of an athlete directly attributable to steroids,
see Telander and Noden, The Death of an Athlete, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 7, 1989, at 68,
and the death of Enrique "Kiki" Camarena, see infra note 2 and accompanying text.
2. Shannon, Desperados, TIME, Nov. 7, 1988, at 84; Thousands Mourn Slain Drug En-
forcement Agent, Oakland Tribune, March 5, 1989, § A, at 5, col. 1.
3. Shannon, supra note 2, at 84.
4. Id.
5. See Cowart, Random Testing During Training Competition May Be the Only Way to
Combat Drugs in Sports, 260 3. A.M.A. 3556(2) (Dec. 23, 1988); Duda, Cocaine May Increase
Drug Tests, 14 Physicians & Sportsmedicine 37 (Aug. 1986).
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drug testing has focused on the workplace and the athletic arena.6 The
deaths of budding basketball superstar Len Bias and veteran professional
football player Don Rogers,7 and more recently, the death of David
Croudip, a defensive back for the Atlanta Falcons,' testify to the infiltra-
tion of drugs into athletics. While such incidents have prompted in-
creases in the use of drug testing, the issue whether such tests will be part
of standard operating procedure in sports has by no means been resolved.
Probing into an individual's private life raises serious constitutional
issues. The "penumbra" of rights surrounding the First, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantees an
individual's right to privacy.9 In addition, California has gone a step
further by specifically securing the right to privacy in Article I of the
California Constitution. 10
This Note examines the confict between an amateur athlete's right
to privacy under the United States and California Constitutions and the
mandate of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) that
all student-athletes be tested for specified banned drugs or be prevented
from participating in college athletics." Part I of this Note describes the
NCAA's drug-testing plan. Part II examines the right to privacy under
the United States Constitution and an application of this standard to the
drug testing of a student-athlete in O'Halloran v. University of Washing-
ton. 2 Part III discusses the right to privacy under the California Consti-
tution and its application to student-athlete drug testing in Jennifer Hill
& Barry McKeever v. National Collegiate Athletic Association."3 Part IV
of the Note compares the analysis used by the two courts, finding that
the O'Halloran opinion is better reasoned because it more accurately de-
scribes the realities of drug use in sports and the need for drug testing in
order to deter or stop such use. The Note concludes by suggesting that
while the opinion in Hill may represent a victory in the fight against drug
testing of student-athletes, it is more likely only an isolated exception:
drug testing appears to be here to stay.
6. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (drug
testing of customs agents); Burnley v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1988), rev'd sub nor. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989)
(drug-testing of train crews involved in accidents); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd
Cir. 1986) (drug testing of horse racing personnel in New Jersey).
7. Keteyian and Selcraig, A Killer Drug Strikes Again, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 7,
1986, at 18 (Both Len Bias and Don Rogers die as a result of cocaine use.).
8. Ballard, Nightcap, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 17, 1988, at 24 (David Croudip dies
after drinking a drink containing cocaine.).
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965).
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
11. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part II, Constitution 3-9-(i).
12. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
13. No. 619209 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., August 10, 1988).
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I. The NCAA Drug-Testing Plan
The NCAA's drug-testing program requires that student-athletes
sign a statement whereby the athlete "consents to be tested for the use of
drugs prohibited by NCAA legislation."14 The list of prohibited drugs
includes drugs commonly associated with drug abuse and death, such as
cocaine, drugs used to enhance performance, such as steroids, and drugs
used to modify body characteristics to disguise the use of banned drugs,
such as diuretics.15 The NCAA plan requires analysis of the student-
athlete's urine to determine use of banned substances. 6 The plan also
stipulates that the furnishing of the urine sample by the student-athlete
be monitored to ensure the integrity of the sample. 7 It is this require-
ment for monitored testing and its invasion into the athlete's private life
that has formed the basis of the constitutional challenge to drug testing
of student-athletes.
II. The Federal Standard
A. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution
and the Bill of Rights to include "penumbras" that give "life and sub-
stance" to the specific guarantees found therein."8 Among the most im-
portant rights created by these "penumbras" is an individual's right to
privacy.19 That right to privacy is guarded by the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard-the highest standard used by the Supreme Court offering the
greatest protection of our personal rights."0 Included in this right to pri-
vacy is the right protected by the Fourth Amendment's restriction on
government searches and seizures.2 The question presented in the con-
text of drug testing is whether this right to privacy may be invoked to
protect an individual from having to provide a urine sample that will be
tested for the presence of banned drugs.
14. Id
15. See Benjamin, Shame of the Games, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 74, 76.
16. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part V, Protocol, Section 1.2. The pro-
gram includes provisions for the athlete to declare the use of legitimate drugs such as cold
medications.
17. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part V, Protocol, Section 5.0-5.5.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
19. Id. at 482.
20. The "strict scrutiny" test employed by the Supreme Court is generally reserved for
cases in which state action creates suspect classifications or impinges on constitutionally pro-
tected rights, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973), such
as the right to privacy. In these situations the challenged action must be narrowly tailored to
serve an important government interest. Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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B. Application to Student-Athlete Drug Testing
To establish federal jurisdiction, a complaint must state a federal
issue, such as the deprivation of a right protected by the United States
Constitution. The student-athlete may establish such a claim based on a
violation of the right to privacy under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which
provides a private cause of action for civil rights violations. 2 To state a
cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must satisfy the two-
prong test of Parrat v. Taylor. 3 The plaintiff must demonstrate first that
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color
of state law,24 and second that the "conduct deprived [the victim] of
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States."25
22. See Zeller v. Donegal School District Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1975)
(federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain complaints brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deprivation of civil rights); see also O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1001
(W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
23. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1001 (quoting Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).
24. Although a thorough examination of whether the acts of an NCAA member-college
constitute state action is beyond the scope of this Note, the issue will be addressed briefly here
because of its importance in determining whether the action falls within federal jurisdiction.
In order to establish state action, the student-athlete must show that in implementing the
NCAA rules the school and the NCAA are acting as agents of the state. See National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461 (1989) (the deprivation of an individual
right must come at the hands of the state in order for the party to be afforded due process
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). The student-athlete must show that the
NCAA specifically, rather than the school, is a state actor because an injunction against the
school will stop only that particular school from enforcing the NCAA regulations. If a school
fails to abide by the regulations, the school and all its sports programs will be dropped from
the NCAA. See infra note 31 (University of Washington has moved to prevent the NCAA
from terminating membership based on University's failure to administer drug-testing pro-
gram).
Until recently, the federal courts were unable to definitively answer whether the NCAA
was a state actor. The leading case in this area was Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984), in which Chaim Arlosoroff was declared ineligible to
play under one of the NCAA eligibility rules. Arlosoroff sued for a preliminary injunction
claiming a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1020. The court found that the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses were inapplicable to the case because the action of the NCAA at issue was private
conduct and not state action. Id. at 1022. The court reviewed the relevant case law history,
noting that early holdings found the NCAA to be a state actor based on "the notion that
indirect involvement of state governments could convert what otherwise would be considered
private conduct into state action." Id. at 1021. The Arlosoroff court recognized that the
Supreme Court had rejected this idea in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), and reconciled
the decision by ruling that earlier cases proclaiming the NCAA a state actor were incorrectly
decided. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988), the Supreme
Court affirmed the Arlosoroff holding that the NCAA was not a state actor. It now appears
that student-athletes challenging the drug-testing plan of the NCAA will have difficulty estab-
lishing the necessary elements of a cause of action under the federal Constitution.
25. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1001 (citing Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).
L Deprivation of a Constitutionally Protected Right
Assuming that the plaintiff can show state action,26 the individual
must then show that he or she has been deprived of a constitutionally
protected right 2 7-- in this case, the right to privacy-in order to make a
claim under section 1983. This privacy issue was recently addressed in
O'Halloran v. University of Washington,2" a case in which Elizabeth
O'Halloran, a sophomore on the University of Washington track team,
challenged the NCAA drug-testing program. The suit was originally
brought against the University in Washington state court, but was re-
moved to federal court after the NCAA was ordered joined as a third
party defendant.29 O'Halloran sought a preliminary injunction that
would allow her to compete during the pendency of the action without
meeting the NCAA drug-testing requirements."0 The district court effec-
tively ruled) on the merits of the case in denying the injunction.'I
In examining the issue of the student's right to privacy, the
O'Halloran court set forth a two-step analysis.32 The court found it nec-
essary first to establish whether there was a search, and second to decide
whether any such search was reasonable.
33
The court in O'Halloran made a cursory inquiry, basically relying
on precedent, before concluding that "the NCAA's urine testing pro-
gram is a search for Fourth Amendment analysis."34 This holding, in
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1001 (citing Parrat, 451 U.S. at 535).
28. 679 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (W.D. Wash.), rev'don other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.
1988). It should be noted that the court dealt with the privacy issue only after establishing
that the NCAA was not a state actor, and that therefore plaintiff's claim had failed at step one
of the Parratt test.
29. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 856 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (1988).
30. Id at 1378.
31. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 997. While O'Halloran's motion was pending, the Uni-
versity dropped its plan to conduct drug-testing in the absence of individualized suspicion, and
as a result, all claims against the University were dropped. 856 F.2d at 1378. Meanwhile, in
light of an order from a Washington Superior Court enjoining the University from requiring
students to sign the NCAA consent form as a condition of eligibility to compete on athletic
teams, the University filed a third party complaint against the NCAA. Id at 1380. The Uni-
versity's goal was to prevent the NCAA from exercising its right to drop the University from
its status as an NCAA member for failure to comply with the NCAA's drug-testing program.
Id at 1380-81. Since the claims against the University were dismissed, the only remaining
issue was whether the NCAA could drop the University for failure to comply with member-
ship requirements-the drug-testing program. The court held that this was a "pure question
of state law," and remanded to the Washington state court. Id at 1381.
Although O'Halloran was reversed on procedural grounds, this reversal is unlikely to
affect the analysis with respect to the substantive right to privacy issues in the federal courts.
See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
32. 679 F. Supp. at 1002.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood tests are searches);
Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987) (urine tests are searches)).
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the context of student-athlete drug testing, is consequently not likely to
be a point of contention in future litigation in this area.35
After determining that there was a search, the court next addressed
whether the search was reasonable.36 Citizens of the United States are
'constitutionally guaranteed the right "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."37 For purposes of fourth amendment analysis, what consti-
tutes a reasonable search "depends on the context within which [the]
search takes place.",38 If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant
issued for probable cause, the search is reasonable;39 a warrant, however,
"is not the sine qua non of reasonableness."'  Generally, a warrantless
search is unreasonable except in certain well-defined cases.4 1 These ex-
ceptions include "searches incident to lawful arrest, the 'automobile ex-
ception,' hot pursuit, plain view, border searches, administrative searches
of closely regulated industries, inventory searches, searches of school-
children's possessions at school, and consent."'42
There was no warrant in O'Halloran; the "search" was simply an
implementation of the NCAA's drug-testing plan by the University of
Washington. Thus, the O'Halloran court did not require a showing of
"probable cause" for the search to be reasonable.43 The court relied on
35. In a case with similar issues, Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.,
864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), the court found that although drug-testing through the taking
of urine samples did constitute a search for fourth amendment purposes, probable cause and
the warrant requirement did not apply. Id. at 1315. Based on a "balancing of the nature and
quality of the intrusion against the importance of'the governmental interest alleged to justify
the intrusion," the court found that the drug-testing program did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1322 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). The court
recognized a convergence of factors that made the search reasonable: the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in the athletic environment; the voluntary participation of students in athletics;
the pervasive regulation of athletics; the school's interest in maintaining a drug-free program;
the limited discretion of the officials performing the search; and the limited uses of the infor-
mation sought-that is, the information may be used for noncriminal educational and rehabili-
tative purposes only. Id. at 1322. As this Note will demonstrate, these are essentially the same
factors used by the O'Halloran court in its analysis. See infra notes 100-101 and accompany-
ing text. Although O'Halloran was reversed, the reversal was on procedural grounds. See
supra note 31.
36. 679 F. Supp. at 1002.
37. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
38. Id. at 1002 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985))).
39. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
40. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1002 (quoting Burnley v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 839 F.2d 575, 582 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'-
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989)).
41. Id.; see also Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
42. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1002.
43. Id. at 1005.
Railway Labor,4' in which the Ninth Circuit balanced "'reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy'" against "'the governmental interest in the safe
and efficient operation of the railroads,' , and concluded that probable
cause was not required to show reasonableness of the search.46 The
O'Halloran court continued to follow the lead of Railway Labor, citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 47 to determine the standard for reasonableness.48 In
T.L. 0., Justice Blackmun stated in a concurring opinion that the warrant
requirement could be excused "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."4 9 The
Court in TL.O. set out a two-prong test to determine whether a search is
reasonable absent a warrant and/or probable cause.5 0 Following this
test, the O'Halloran court first analyzed whether the search was justified
at its inception, and then examined whether the search as conducted was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the inter-
ference in the first place."'
The O'Halloran court also took notice of the reasonableness stan-
dard propounded in O'Connor v. Ortega.52 This standard requires bal-
ancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion."53 The standard also considers
both whether there is a belief that the wrongdoing will be revealed by the
search and whether the scope of the search is reasonable.5 4 The court in
O'Halloran combined the O'Connor and TL.O. standards to create its
own test of what constitutes a reasonable search under the circum-
stances,55 first applying the T.L.O. two-prong test to determine whether
the basis for, and the scope of, the search was reasonable, 6 and second,
following the O'Connor test by weighing the competing interests of the
two parties.
57
44. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
45. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004 (quoting Railway Labor, 839 F.2d at 586).
46. Id. at 1002-05.
47. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
48. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
49. 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).-
50. Id. at 341.
51. 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
52. Id. at 1003-04 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987)).
53. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 719 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). Note that this is the same standard
used by the court in Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., see supra note 35.
54. Id. at 726.
55. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004-05.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1004-07.
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2. Application of the T.L.O. Test to the O'Halloran Facts
The inquiry in O'Halloran was whether there were "reasonable
grounds for believing that urine tests of student-athletes will turn up evi-
dence of misconduct-inappropriate [sic] drug use." s The Supreme
Court had not previously determined whether this suspicion must be in-
dividualized, that is, aimed at a particular person. The Court in
O'Connor did find "individualized suspicion"; nevertheless, the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether individualized suspicion must exist. 9
The Railway Labor court also addressed the individualized suspi-
cion issue.6' Railway Labor considered whether it was permissible for
the Federal Railroad Administration to conduct mandatory blood and
urine tests after certain train accidents and fatal incidents, or to author-
ize breath and urine tests subsequent to other accidents and incidents.6
In holding that individualized suspicion was "essential to finding toxico-
logical testing of railroad employees justified at its inception,"62 the Rail-
way Labor court distinguished on two grounds those situations in which
a search of a person is permitted without a warrant or individualized
suspicion. First, the degree of intrusion in, for example, searches at auto-
mobile checkpoints or preboarding searches of airline passengers, does
not approach the level involved in toxicological63 testing of body fluids;
and second, in each case there is a vital government interest, such as
national self-protection or the need to combat terrorism, which excuses
the requirement of particularized suspicion.6"
The O'Halloran court rejected both the O'Connor and Railway La-
bor approaches and instead held that individual or particularized suspi-
cion was not required to show reasonableness. 65 It reasoned that past
incidents of improper drug use by athletes, "widely publicized" in the
news media, were adequate grounds for search. The court was persuaded
by the NCAA's "laudable" goal of "attempting to educate, ferret out,
58. Id. at 1004. The Railway Labor court, which originated this standard for determining
whether a search was justified at its inception, used the word "suspecting," 839 F.2d 575, 587
(9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989), whereas O'Halloran used the word "believing," 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
59. 480 U.S. at 726.
60. 839 F.2d at 575, rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989). Although the Ninth Circuit in Railway Labor found that urine testing was
not minimally intrusive and thus could not withstand fourth amendment scrutiny, 839 F.2d at
586, the Supreme Court, on appeal, used a similar analysis but found that the search/drug test
was reasonable, Skinner v. Railway Labor, 109 S. Ct. at 1417, just as the court held in
O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
61. 839 F.2d at 577-79.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Toxicology relates to the testing of body fluids for poisons. In the context of a drug-
testing program, any banned or prohibited drug would be classified as a "poison."
64. Railway Labor, 839 F.2d at 586.
65. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
DRUG TESTING
and deter drug abuse among student-athletes," concluding that there was
"a reasonable basis for believing that urine testing will turn up evidence
of inappropriate drug use by student-athletes."66
The O'Halloran court distinguished Shoemaker v. Handel67 as in-
volving different circumstances.6" In Shoemaker, the court upheld the
validity of warrantless breath and urine testing of New Jersey race track
personnel such as jockeys and trainers, on the grounds that such testing
is exempt from typical fourth amendment considerations under the ad-ministrative search exception.69 The Shoemaker court ruled that in or-
der to fall within this exception, the government action must reflect, first,
a showing of "strong state interest in conducting an unannounced
search," and second, that "the pervasive regulation of the industry [has]
reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the subject of the search."7
The court found that New Jersey's strong interest in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the horse racing industry justified warrantless searches. 71 Also,
the nature of New Jersey horse racing regulations created a decreased
expectation of privacy.72 The combination of a strong state interest and
reduced expectation of privacy were sufficient to pass the standard for
the administrative search exception. 73 The Shoemaker court recognized
the distinction between the search of premises and persons, but found
that when the principal regulatory concern was the person, "the distinc-
tions are not so significant that warrantless testing for alcohol and drug
use can be said to be constitutionally unreasonable."'74 The court also
noted that administrative searches were unlike traditional warrantless
searches since the jockeys were subjected to breathalyzer tests daily,
75
and knew that they could be subject to warrantless urinalysis testing on
66. IM
67. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
68. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
69. 795 F.2d at 1142. An administrative search is an exception to the traditional "war-
rant based on probable cause" requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In order for a search
to fall within this exception it must meet three requirements under current Supreme Court
standards: First, the government must have a substantial interest in the regulatory scheme
pursuant to which the inspection is made; second, a warrantless inspection must be necessary
to further the scheme; and third, the statute under which the inspection program operates
must serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). The court in Shoemaker listed only two requirements that must be
met in order for a search to fall within the exception, though the third requirement from
Burger was arguably satisfied in Shoemaker as well.
70. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. But see supra note 69 and infra note 199 (three require-
ments for the administrative search exception under the Supreme Court's decision in Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987)).




75. Id. at 1139.
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days they raced. Thus, they had at least general notice of impending
searches.7" The jockeys' only remaining concern was the potential inva-
sion of privacy resulting from the lack of confidentiality of the test re-
suits. The court found that this issue was not ripe for adjudication and
left the jockeys with the option of returning to court if the Racing Com-
mission failed to comply with the proposed confidentiality rules.
7
Arguably, however, Shoemaker need not be distinguished. Instead
it may serve as precedent for the holding in O'Halloran. Both cases in-
volve essentially equivalent warrantless searches. The search in Shoe-
maker was conducted pursuant to a regulation of the New Jersey State
Racing Commission, 8 while the search in O'Halloran was conducted
pursuant to the 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Plan.7 9 Neither regulation
requires a warrant, but both put the testee on notice of the possibility of a
breath or urine test.80 Also, both courts recognized a public interest in
maintaining the integrity of the regulated field.81 In fact, the O'Halloran
court expressly recognized the common public interest element it shares
with Shoemaker.8 2 Shoemaker held that the principal concern of the reg-
ulation was the person-the jockey. 83 The O'Halloran court expressly
held that the student-athlete was the principal concern of the regulation,
and this holding was supported by the NCAA drug-testing plan.8" The
significant difference is that Shoemaker maintained that the horse racing
industry is pervasively regulated,85 while OHalloran did not say the
same of the NCAA, although arguably it is. 86
With regard to the second T.L.O. prong, O'Connor v. Ortega stated
that "[t]he search will be permissible in its scope when 'the measures
76. Id. at 1142.
77. Id. at 1144.
78. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.10-11 (1985).
79. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part II, Constitution 3-9-(i).
80. The regulation at issue in Shoemaker provided that the jockeys would be subject to a
breathalyzer test every day, and might be subject to a urine test on days they raced. 795 F.2d
at 1139. The NCAA regulation provides that the student-athlete must sign a consent form
prior to the season in which she agrees to be tested for use of the enumerated banned drugs
prior to participation in a postseason/championship event. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 998.
Failure to sign the consent form will result in a denial of eligibility to play in regular season
competition, and failure to submit to the drug test (or submitting and testing positive) will bar
the student from participating in any postseason events. Id. The student-athlete was put on
notice by the regulation requiring her consent prior to the season that she might be subject to
testing prior to participation in any postseason events.
81. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142; O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1003.
82. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1003.
83. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
84. Consider the prefatory statement to the 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Plan, stating
that the goals of the plan are to preserve the integrity of collegiate athletics by making sure
that no participant has an "artificially induced advantage," and to "safeguard the health and
safety of the participants." Preface to The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program.
85. 795 F.2d at 1142.
86. See note 198 and accompanying text.
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of... the nature of the misconduct.' "I' As
with the first prong of T.L.O., however, the O'Connor Court declined to
determine whether the standard had been met, thus failing to engage in
any analysis of the application of this second prong. 8
The holding in T.L.O. provides a standard for applying the second
prong of the test. T.L.O. involved the search of a fourteen-year-old stu-
dent's purse by a school official. The court found that the search was
reasonable based on consideration of all the attendant circumstances. 9
Part of the inquiry was based on the two-part test at issue here. The
Court did not analyze the second prong extensively, but did indicate in a
footnote that courts should defer to the judgment of school officials when
evaluating the rules governing conduct in schools, unless the rule violates
some "substantive constitutional guarantee." 90
Like the O'Connor Court, O'Halloran made short work of this sec-
ond prong of the T.L. 0. test. Stating simply that "the scope of the pro-
gram is fully tailored to address the need," the court found that the
second prong of the test was satisfied. 91 "The rationale for the time,
place, manner, and type of testing is discussed fully in [the doctor's] affi-
davit, and the court will not substitute its judgment for the expertise of
those who developed the ... program." 92 As in TL.O., the court de-
ferred almost exclusively to the judgment of the rulemaking body and
avoided making any independent judgment of its own.
3. Weighing the Competing Interests
After the O'Halloran court found that the two-prong test of T.L.0.
was satisfied, it continued its reasonableness inquiry by weighing the al-
leged invasion of the student-athlete's constitutional right to privacy
against the countervailing interests of the drug-testing program. The
"interests" in the program included the public health interest as well as
the interests of the University and the NCAA in fair competition.
93
As discussed earlier, the NCAA plan requires monitored collection
of the urine specimen in order to maintain the integrity of the sample.
94
It is this aspect, coupled with disclosures about an individual's private
life that a chemical analysis of a urine sample is likely to yield, that forms
the basis for the student-athlete's right to privacy claim. O'Halloran ex-
87. 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
88. Id.
89. 469 U.S. at 340-42.
90. Id. at 342 n.9.
91. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Implementation of the NCAA Drug-
Testing Program, § 5.2.1.
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amined this alleged invasion of privacy in the context of a university ath-
letic program and concluded that the drug-testing program constituted a
relatively small intrusion into the individual's private life.9 5 In support
of this conclusion, the court stated that there is "a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in the context of a university athletic program."96 This
"diminished expectation of privacy" potentially would allow an alterna-
tive avenue of enforcing a drug-testing program against student-athletes
that is discussed in part V.97 Next, the court pointed out that health
examinations are fairly routine for an athlete, and in the context of such
an examination, a certain amount of viewing and touching was allowed
among relative strangers that would be firmly rejected in most other situ-
ations.98 The court recognized that while providing a urine sample in an
ordinary health examination may be fairly routine, doing so in front of a
witness was extraordinary. Nevertheless, the court held that this was not
an unreasonable invasion of the student's right to privacy.99
The court next addressed whether the countervailing interests out-
weighed the student-athlete's right to privacy. The court looked to the
affidavit of Professor Dugal, the plaintiff's drug-testing expert, and the
1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program to determine the program goals.
These goals were to stop or deter the misuse and abuse of drugs in college
athletics, to educate student-athletes about the dangers of using drugs, to
preserve the health of student-athletes, to make sure that no participant
in athletics has an unfair, artificially induced advantage, and to maintain
the integrity of college athletics. 1" In light of the importance and valid-
ity of these interests as compared to the student-athlete's right to privacy,
the court found that the "[p]laintiff has not demonstrated that there has
been an invasion of any constitutionally protected right requiring invali-
dation of the drug-testing program." 101
4. Summary of the Federal Standard
The O'Halloran case fairly represents the typical scenario of a stu-
dent-athlete challenging the NCAA's drug-testing program in federal
court. In order to establish a cause of action, the student must satisfy the
two-step test propounded in Parratt v. Taylor.10 There must first be a
95. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
96. Id at 1002.
97. See infra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
98. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1002. The court also noted that there is an element of
communal undress present in the context of a University athletic program that is not present
in other cases, ag., Burnley v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Shoemaker
v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
99. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1002.
100. Id. at 1006-07.
101. IM at 1007.
102. 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
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showing of "state action," followed by a showing that the student-athlete
is deprived of a constitutionally protected right, such as the right to pri-
vacy.10 3 As demonstrated in O'Halloran, the current state of the law
leaves the student-athlete unable to satisfy either of the test's require-
ments, and thus the cause of action will fail.
O'Halloran is typical in another sense in that the opinion deals with
an attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction-the plaintiff's primary
objective. Without that injunction, the clock runs on the student-ath-
lete's eligibility during the pendency of the case. Since the student-ath-
lete only has four years of eligibility in college athletics, every year that
passes is a year lost in terms of athletic eligibility. 1°4 As noted in
O'Halloran, the Ninth Circuit standard for the grant of a preliminary
injunction is determined on "a continuum in which the required showing
of harm varies inversely with the required showing of meritorious-
ness."105 If a plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that she could establish a
cause of action, there is absolutely no chance of success on the merits of
the case, and the preliminary injunction would thus be denied.
I. The California Standard
A. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has special significance in California. The right
is specifically guaranteed in the California Constitution. 10 6 By contrast
the federal Constitution does not mention privacy, although the United
States Supreme Court has located the right to privacy in the "penumbra"
of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.107
The right of privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution is conse-
quently more extensive than that guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion.108 The question is whether this more extensive right to privacy will
protect the student-athlete from the NCAA drug-testing plan where the
federal Constitution has failed.
103. Id.
104. The college athlete's eligibility is governed by the rule that is generally stated as giving
the athlete "five to play four." That is, once an athlete enters college sports, she may play four
years in any one sport. The athlete is given five years, however, in which to use these four
years of eligibility; the athlete can thus sit out a season in the event of an unforeseen eventual-
ity, such as injury or academic problems.
105. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 999 (citing Card v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union
High School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1473 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)).
106. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186,
195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984).
107. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See infra notes 18-19 and accom-
panying text.
108. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 262-63, 625
P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1987).
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B. Application of the California Standard to Student-Athlete Drug
Testing
The most recent case to test the validity of the drug testing of stu-
dent-athletes in California is Jennifer Hill & Barry McKeever v. NCAA . "
This case, brought by Stanford linebacker Barry McKeever and Jennifer
Hill, co-captain of the women's soccer team, challenged the NCAA
drug-testing regulation. The challenge was based on a violation of the
student-athlete's right to privacy under the California Constitution.
As in O'Halloran, the Hill plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction.
In Hill, the court used a much more stringent test for whether the right
to privacy has been invaded. Since the plaintiffs did not bring the claim
in federal court, they did not have to assert that the NCAA or the Uni-
versity was a state actor because the California right to privacy applies to
intrusions by both private and governmental entities. 110 The Hill court
recognized that "the right to privacy is not absolute," '111 but held that
once an invasion of privacy has been shown, the burden shifts to the
defendant to satisfy a four-part test to prove the invasion is justified. The
defendant must show that: (1) a "compelling interest" necessitated the
intrusion; (2) the invasion was "necessary to further that purpose"; (3)
the intrusion was "narrowly drawn to assure maximum protection of the
constitutional interests at stake"; and (4) there was no "less intrusive
means" to achieve that interest.
1 12
1. Is There an Invasion of the Right to Privacy?
The Hill court found unequivocally that the NCAA's drug-testing
program invaded the plaintiff's right to privacy." 3 The court found four
different invasions of the right: (1) the taking of monitored urine sam-
ples114; (2) the resulting disclosure of "private and secret details about
the athlete's private life"'; (3) the "media attention and speculation"
about the test results of student-athletes declared ineligible' 16; and (4) the
109. No. 619209 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Hill].
110. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1976).
111. Hill at 24.
112. Hill at 24-25 (citing Long Beach City Employees v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d
937, 948, 719 P.2d 660, 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96-97 (1986); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,
533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975); Boler v. Solano County, 201 Cal. App. 3d 467, 247
Cal. Rptr. 185 (1987)).
113. Hill at 11.
114. Hill at 25.
115. Id.; see Boler, 201 Cal. App. 3d 467, 247 Cal. Rptr. 185; see also Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 588 (N.D. Ohio 1987); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 892, 506
P.2d 232, 237, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 413 (1973).
116. Hill at 25; see White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 106 (1975); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 830, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 842 (1976).
unwarranted intrusion into the medical treatment of a student-athlete. 117
For purposes of this article, it is useful to look at the factual basis for
each of these findings which are based solely on testimony taken at trial.
The NCAA program requires that the collection of samples be
monitored to insure the integrity of the samples. 11  The Hill court found
that direct monitoring of an athlete urinating was not necessary to the
collection of a valid sample.1 19 Furthermore, the court found that the
requirement that the act of urination be watched by an NCAA monitor
who is not necessarily a member of the medical profession is both "de-
grading and embarrassing."' 20
Obviously, toxicological testing of an individual's urine is going to
reveal details about the nature of the substances that the individual is
ingesting, as well as personal details such as medical conditions. The
Hill court found that the discovery of such information impermissibly
invaded an individual's right to privacy. 121 The court was particularly
concerned that the urinalysis might reveal the presence of drugs legally
taken but prohibited by the NCAA plan, such as over-the-counter medi-
cations or anabolic steroids taken pursuant to a doctor's orders; the pres-
ence of drugs, such as marijuana, taken with no connection to athletic
performance; or the presence of a substance over which the athlete has
no control, such as the passive inhalation of marijuana smoke.1
22
The Hill court also found it "virtually impossible" to avoid the me-
dia speculation attendant to the situation in which the NCAA declares
an athlete ineligible under the its drug-testing plan. 123 The court found
that this type of attention is "counterproductive and psychologically
damaging to a student-athlete, whether or not he did anything
improper.'
124
Finally, the court found that the test results and/or declarations by
the student-athlete would yield "confidential medical information" and
details of "sensitive medical conditions"; these disclosures would consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of the individual's right to privacy, 125 and
would also interfere with both the athlete's right to self-treatment and
117. Hill at 25; see Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220, 225 (1984).
118. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Implementation of the Drug-Testing
Program § 5.2.1.
119. Hill at 10. Presumably the court felt alternative measures were sufficiently reliable,
such as taking the temperature of the sample to ensure its freshness.
120. Id. at 10, "Conclusion of Fact" #14.
121. Iae at 10, "Conclusion of Fact" #5-16, 18.
122. Id. at 10-11.
123. Id. at 11, "Conclusion of Fact" # 17.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 10, "Conclusion of Fact" #12. Specifically, the court noted that women ath-
letes were asked whether they were taking birth control pills.
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the doctor's ability to treat the athlete.12 6 This finding was also based in
part on the section of the California Health and Safety Code that states
in part that "adult person[s] have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care."'
127
Based on the foregoing findings, the Hill court ruled that the
NCAA's drug-testing program invaded the right to privacy of Jennifer
Hill and Barry McKeever.
28
2. Is the Invasion Justified?
Once the invasion of the right to privacy is shown, the defendant
must carry the "heavy burden" of justifying the invasion.'29 As stated
earlier, the defendant must show that: (1) a "compelling interest" neces-
sitated the intrusion; (2) the invasion was "necessary to further that pur-
pose"; (3) the intrusion was "narrowly drawn" to assure maximum
protection of the constitutional interests at stake; and (4) there was no
"less intrusive means" to achieve that interest.130 The court found that
the NCAA failed on all four counts.
The Hill court first addressed the question whether a sufficient com-
pelling interest existed to justify the invasion of privacy. The court
looked at whether there was sufficient evidence of drug use by college
athletes to justify the intrusion' or whether the health and safety of the
student-athlete was of sufficient concern to create a compelling need for
drug testing.'32 In addition, the court examined whether the interest in
fair competition could justify this invasion of the student-athlete's
privacy.
133
Based on testimony heard at trial, the Hill court found that the ma-
jority of student-athletes do not use or abuse drugs. 34 To support this
finding, the court looked to the results of past NCAA drug-testing pro-
grams, which found little evidence of drug use by student-athletes. 35 In
fact, the program found that less than 1% (34 of 3511) of the students
tested under the 1986-87 Program were declared ineligible and that no
woman had ever been declared ineligible. 136 Moreover, the court found
126. Id at 10, "Conclusion of Fact" #13.
127. CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 7186 (West 1990).
128. Hill at 25.
129. Id at 25 (citing Boler v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 467, 247 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1987)).
130. Id. at 24-25.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 11-12. It seems odd that the court would use evidence from the program it is
evaluating to test the validity of that program, especially since the NCAA program will tend to
deter drug use and the results of the test will therefore tend to understate the actual number of
that despite the evidence of low drug use, the statistics may have over-
stated the problem. The court based its finding on: (1) the fact that some
testing is based on reasonable suspicion, thereby tending to give higher
percentages of findings of drug use; (2) the fact that the data is derived
from the number of tests, not the number of students, and since positive
samples are retested, one athlete may account for several positive find-
ings; (3) the fact that samples that test positive for more than one banned
substance are counted as one sample but multiple results; and (4) the fact
that some positive results may have come from proper use of medication,
such as prescription drugs.'37
As for the types of drugs used, the court found only scattered evi-
dence of the use of street drugs, such as cocaine or marijuana, while the
majority of the evidence found showed use of anabolic steroids. 13  Fi-
nally, the court found no evidence of use of diuretics in wrestling to
"make weight."'139 The court found that "[a]ll the evidence taken to-
gether demonstrates that there is no drug involvement in any sport ex-
cept football and that the problem relates only to steroid use and involves
a small minority of the football players."'" Based on the foregoing, the
Hill court found insufficient evidence of drug use to "create a compelling
need for drug testing."' 4 1
As for the idea that drug testing is necessary to protect the health of
student-athletes, the court was very blunt:
Even if protecting health and safety is one of the goals of the cur-
rent NCAA drug-testing program ... there is no evidence that
drug use in athletic competition is endangering the health and
safety of student-athletes. There is no evidence that any college
athlete has ever been injured in competition as a result of drug
use. 142
Further, there was no finding "that any student-athlete ha[d] ever injured
anyone else as a result of drug use."' 143 The court concluded that the
student-athletes who are drug users. This use of evidence creates a circular argument that is
akin to claiming that there is no need for a police force in a certain area because that area has a
large police force and there is little or no crime. It does not require a great leap of logic to
conclude that the reason there is little evidence of drug use is because of the regulatory efforts,
not despite them. The O'Ialloran court addressed precisely this issue when it said, "It should
be observed additionally that such [drug] testing will have a deterrent effect, and that over time
less evidence will be found. Such evidence of the program's success should not be used to
demonstrate lack of need for the program or that the program has no reasonable basis." 679
F. Supp. at 1004.
137. Hill at 12.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 13-14. "Make weight" refers to the efforts of a wrestler to fall within the bound-
aries (defined by weight) of his class of competition.
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program might actually be harmful to students by banning FDA-ap-
proved medications designed to improve the health of the student-ath-
lete, and by failing to protect the student-athlete's health in other areas,
(i.e., by testing for measles, or prohibiting the use of alcohol or smok-
ing). II Furthermore, the NCAA provides no program for counseling or
rehabilitation for drug users. 145 Based on these findings, the court ruled
that the health and safety of the student-athlete fell short as a compelling
reason for justifying drug testing among student-athletes. 1 "
The Hill court also found that despite the fact that promoting fair
competition was a stated goal of the NCAA program, there was no evi-
dence to establish that any of the banned substances actually enhanced
the athletes' performance.14 7 The court found that "[alt best, the...
performance enhancement [possibilities] of steroids is a scientific contro-
versy which will not be resolved in the foreseeable future,"' 48 and "no
one has scientifically demonstrated that ... improvements in strength
will translate into enhanced performance for football players." 49 Also,
there was no evidence that amphetamines, "street drugs," or diuretics
enhance performance, and if anything they may be harmful to athletic
performance. 50 Based on this dearth of evidence, the court found no
compelling need to test for drugs to ensure fair competition.15'
The court found that the NCAA program did not serve its purpose
since the testing method did not demonstrate sufficient accuracy, 1 52 and
an athlete could therefore be declared ineligible on insufficient data.'53
The court also found that the NCAA program did not effectively reach
its goal of promoting fair competition and protecting the health and
safety of the student-athlete.' 54
The court acknowledged that although the NCAA testing method
was the most reliable available, "it is not perfect."' 55 After giving cur-
sory treatment to some rather complex scientific conclusions, the court
essentially held that while the testing was generally accurate, an unac-
ceptably high possibility of error existed in the process.156 The court also
144. Id. at 15.
145. Id
146. Id at 14.
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id at 16-18.
151. Id. at 17.
152. Id. at 20.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 18.
156. Id at 19. As evidence for its holding, the court pointed out that the testing cannot
distinguish between heroin and morphine. This is a significant distinction since morphine has
redeeming values as a drug when administered as medical treatment by a physician, while
found that the method of testing for marijuana could result in a positive
test when the student-athlete had merely passively inhaled marijuana
smoke while in the same room as someone smoking marijuana. 157
The Hill court based its conclusion that the NCAA failed in its at-
tempt to promote fair competition on the finding that the NCAA pro-
gram, as designed, would not determine whether a student-athlete had
used a banned substance in preparation for a postseason event.' 58 The
court found that the NCAA program failed in several respects: the test-
ing did not determine whether the banned substance affected the athlete's
performance; the testing was done so far in advance of the game ("days
or weeks") that the test could not possibly determine whether the drugs
affected performance; positive tests for marijuana could show up long
after the effect of the drug had worn off; tests conducted during post-
season could not detect the presence of steroids used primarily in train-
ing; drug testing has not been scientifically shown to be an effective
deterrent to drug use; and drug testing without counseling or rehabilita-
tion is not an effective deterrent.' 59 These findings led the court to con-
clude that the NCAA drug-testing program was ineffective in achieving
its stated goal.
Based on the evidence at trial, the court, in few words, found the
program overbroad because its tests "include[d] substances which do not
enhance athletic performance."'' Also, the list of banned substances
was "fatally overbroad" because each category of banned substances con-
tained the words "others" or "and related compounds," making it im-
possible to, define exactly which drugs were banned and which were
not.
1 6 1
Finally, the Hill court found that the NCAA had not carried its
burden of showing that there was no less intrusive means available to
further the stated goals of promoting fair competition and protecting the
safety and health of the student-athlete.
162
These problems aside, the Hill court focused on two possible alter-
natives, drug education and counseling and testing based on reasonable
suspicion, 63 The court found that drug education would be an effective
heroin does not. Another potential for error the court identified is that the consumption of
food containing poppy seeds can result in a positive test for opiates.
157. IM at 20.
158. Id.
159. Id at 21.
160. Id at 20.
161. Id As evidence to support this finding, the court pointed out that even the NCAA
personnel in charge of the program are unable to identify which drugs are banned. Three
witnesses at trial thought codeine was on the list of banned substances, one was not sure, and
two thought it was excluded from the list.
162. Id. at 22.
163. Id
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means of deterring drug use."6 Again, based on testimony at trial, the
court found that a drug education program would deter drug use by stu-
dent-athletes because it would teach them the dangers of drugs and show
them that drugs do not enhance athletic performance, but have only a
placebo effect at best.
165
The court further stated that a drug education program is a viable
alternative that had not been adequately considered by the NCAA.166 In
support of this alternative the court looked at the money spent on educa-
tion as opposed to testing. From 1975 to 1985 the NCAA spent
$200,000 on drug education, while in 1986 alone, the first year of the
drug-testing program, the NCAA spent $1,000,000 on drug testing.
167
The court also found that the NCAA "ha[d] not adequately consid-
ered and used testing based on a reasonable suspicion as an alternative to
[its] random testing [program]." 168 Presumably, the court in Hill would
find that testing based on reasonable suspicion satisfied the need for prob-
able cause, and therefore the "search," providing a urine sample, would
pass constitutional muster. The court indicated that a program based on
reasonable suspicion is a less intrusive means that the NCAA may use to
achieve its stated goals and that such programs had been upheld by other
courts.169 The court specifically looked at testing for anabolic steroids
based on reasonable suspicion. The court identified several factors as in-
dicators of the possible use of anabolic steroids. These factors included
large weight increases over a short time span, aggressive behavior, pim-
ples, body odor and changing hair patterns. 170 The court recognized that
these indicators were not infallible, but stated that the current NCAA
program was also fallible. 171 While the court acknowledged these short-
comings, the opinion leaves several gaping holes. Even assuming that the
court's brief outline would suffice as a testing procedure for anabolic ster-
oids based on reasonable suspicion, the court did not describe probable
cause for a "search" for the other drugs on the NCAA list of banned
substances. A program based on "reasonable suspicion" will simply en-
courage drug users to be more secretive and more creative in disguising





168. Id. at 23.
169. Id. at 27. See also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id.
DRUG TESTING
3. The Right to Privacy Versus the Privilege to Play
The NCAA argued that participation in college athletics is a privi-
lege, not a right, and therefore the NCAA can require student-athletes to
waive their right to privacy in exchange for the privilege of playing col-
lege athletics." 2 In rejecting this argument, 173 Hill relied on Long Beach
City Employees Association. v. City of Long Beach.14 In Long Beach, the
court held that an individual could not waive the constitutional right of
privacy in exchange for a privilege. Hill echoed this holding, stating that
"[t]he NCAA cannot coerce student-athletes to give up a (sic) constitu-
tional privacy rights as a condition of eligibility.... ."I"
The possible waiver of a constitutional right was the last hurdle the
Hill court had to clear. Since the right to privacy could not be waived in
exchange for the privilege to play, the rest of the holding fell into place.
The court had found that drug testing of student-athletes constituted an
invasion of privacy. 17 6 Once the invasion of privacy had been estab-
lished, the NCAA was required to show: (1) that a "compelling interest"
necessitated the intrusion; (2) that the intrusion was "necessary to fur-
ther that purpose"; (3) that the intrusion was "narrowly drawn" to as-
sure maximum protection of the constitutional interests at stake; and (4)
that there was no "less intrusive means" to achieve that interest. 177 The
court found that the NCAA had failed in an attempt to make any of
these required showings and consequently the court permanently en-
joined the NCAA from enforcing its drug-testing policies against Stan-
ford student-athletes. 7 The NCAA could not require that student-
athletes sign waiver forms as a condition of participation in athletics. 79
In addition, it could not declare these athletes ineligible or take punitive
action against any athlete for failure to comply with the drug-testing pro-
gram or in any way discriminate against Stanford or its athletes as a
result of the court order.'
IV. Discussion: A Critical Comparison of Hill and O'Halloran
Although the two cases, O'Halloran in United States district court
and Hill in California state court, dealt with the same subject and issues,
the two courts resolved those issues completely differently. The remain-
172. I at 27.
173. Id
174. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
175. Hill at 27.
176. Id. at 11.
177. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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der of this Note will examine how the analyses differ and will discuss
whether the cases can be reconciled.
The O'Halloran court began by determining whether the student-
athlete had been deprived of a constitutionally protected right. The
court focused on whether there was a search, and if so, whether it was
reasonable, the most extensive analysis centering on what standard
would suffice to render the search "reasonable."
The court then weighed the student-athlete's interest in the right to
privacy against the competing interests in the administration of the drug-
testing program. The court found that the inquiry into whether there
had been an invasion of the right to privacy was one of degree.
The Hill court attempted to develop a bright-line test, but the court
drew lines relying on vague or questionable standards. It first deter-
mined the existence of an invasion of the right to privacy-a yes-or-no
inquiry with no gray areas. The court then stated that if it found an
invasion of the right, the defendant (NCAA) must satisfy a four-part test
justifying the invasion.
Generally, a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued for
probable cause is reasonable.""1 O'Halloran found a search reasonable
even though the search was not conducted pursuant to a warrant issued
for probable cause and did not fall into one of the enumerated exceptions
to the warrant/probable cause requirement.1 2 O'Halloran applied the
two-prong test of New Jersey v. T.L. .1 3 to determine whether the basis
for, and the scope of, the search was reasonable. The court then weighed
the competing interests of the two parties as required by O'Connor v.
Ortega 18 4 to complete the reasonableness inquiry. 8 5
A. Does "General Suspicion" Create a Reasonable Basis for Search or
an Invasion of the Right to Privacy?
The first prong of the TL. 0. test deals with whether a search is
justified at its inception. In the drug-testing context, the primary issue is
whether there is a need for individualized suspicion, or whether a general
suspicion with regard to drug use by student-athletes will suffice. The
O'Halloran court found no need for individualized suspicion.18 6 The
goals of the NCAA and past evidence of drug use by student-athletes
gave the NCAA a reasonable basis for conducting a search.
181. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
183. 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
184. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
185. See generally O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1004-07
(W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
186. 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
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As for the second prong of the T.L.O. test, whether the search is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the search
at its inception, the courts generally defer to the judgment of the rule-
making body; 8 7 this deference essentially guarantees a finding that the
prong has been met. O'Halloran found that "widely publicized" drug
use by student-athletes was sufficient evidence to justify a search (the
taking of a urine sample).' s By contrast, the Hill court found that the
majority of student-athletes do not use or abuse drugs, and that drug use
by student-athletes is not therefore a sufficiently compelling justification
for the invasion of the right to privacy. 189 Furthermore, the Hill court
found that the media attention associated with the declaration that an
athlete is ineligible for failing the drug test constituted an invasion of the
student-athlete's right to privacy.190 The evidence for this finding came
from test results from the 1986-87 NCAA drug-testing program. 191
Regarding the evidence of drug use by student-athletes, the
O'Halloran opinion is better reasoned. The O'Halloran court found that
in light of the evidence of drug'use by student-athletes and the laudable
goals of the NCAA, no individualized suspicion was necessary for the
search to be reasonable. ' 92 The court gave great deference to the NCAA
on this issue. This deference gains greater significance in light of the
suggestion in the following section of this Note for implementing a statu-
tory drug-testing program for student-athletes. This suggestion, if en-
acted, would probably pass California's constitutional right-to-privacy
standard.
B. Making the Test "Reasonable" by Statute: Applying Burger to Drug
Testing of Student-Athletes
In New York v. Burger,93 the Supreme Court ruled on the validity
of a statute that authorized warrantless inspections of vehicle-disman-
tling businesses (junkyards). The avowed purpose of the statute was to
deter the use of junkyards as a conduit for the disposal of stolen vehi-
187. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343 n.9; O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
188. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
189. Hill at 14.
190. Id. at 11. Media coverage of drug use is accepted more readily as evidence of drug use
than as invasion of privacy. The idea that media coverage constitutes an invasion of privacy
suggests that a student-athlete would have a cause of action against said media for a violation
of that right. This suggestion presents freedom of speech problems, !e., prior restraint, beyond
the scope of this Note. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(Four Justices found that there could be no prior restraint unless grave damage to the country
was a virtual certainty-hardly likely given the facts of Hill or O'Halloran. In addition, Jus-
tices Black and Douglas would never allow a prior restraint of the press.).
191. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
192. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
193. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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cles.'94 The defendant and junkyard business owner, Joseph Burger,
challenged the statute, claiming searches undertaken pursuant to the
statute violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.195 The Court upheld the statute, finding that it
fell within the exception to a warrant requirement as an administrative
inspection of a "closely regulated" business that has a lesser expectation
of privacy.'96 The situation in Burger may be analogized to the drug
testing of student-athletes. The Burger Court pointed out that when the
person subjected to a search has a reduced expectation of privacy, the
warrant and probable cause requirements have a lessened application.'9 7
In O'Halloran, the court noted the "diminished expectation of privacy in
the context of a university athletic program."' 98 The Burger exception
thus might allow a corresponding lessening of the warrant and probable
cause requirements.
The Burger Court enumerated three criteria that, if met, would
deem the search reasonable under the administrative search exception.
The government must have a "substantial" interest in the regulation and
its purpose, the regulation must be "necessary to further the regulatory
scheme," and the statute must provide a "constitutionally adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant."' 99
Before addressing these three criteria, however, the Court had to
find that the business at issue-vehicle dismantling-was a "closely regu-
lated" business.200 The Court noted that the duration of the regulatory
scheme was relevant, but found that although the automobile is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, automobile junkyards are simply a branch of an
industry (general junkyards and secondhand stores) that had existed and
had been regulated for many years, and that automobile junkyards are
consequently a closely regulated industry.20' The Court used a circular
argument: the automobile junkyard industry is closely regulated because
the statute regulating the industry suggests that it is. The Court avoided
the issue of the relative youth of the industry by saying that it was a
branch of an industry that had historically been regulated.
If amateur athletics could be categorized as a closely regulated in-
dustry, drug testing of student-athletes might be legitimized pursuant to
a statute similar to the one in Burger. The first step would be to pass a
detailed statute suggesting that college athletics are closely regulated and
194. Id. at 708-09.
195. See id. at 696-98.
196. Id. at 712-13.
197. Id. at 702.
198. See note 94-99 and accompanying text; O'Haloran v. University of Washington, 679
F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
199. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.
200. Id. at 703-04.
201. Id. at 705-06.
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requiring drug testing of student-athletes. Although the NCAA program
itself has a relatively short history, NCAA sports are a branch of sports
in general. In addition, both the multiplicity of rules by which the games
are played and the detailed rules governing the eligibility of college ath-
letes suggest that sports have been closely regulated since their formal
organization. Thus, based on this history, NCAA sports would be con-
sidered a closely regulated industry.
The next step would be to examine the statute in light of the three-
part Burger test to determine whether the search qualifies as an exception
to the warrant requirement. The test first requires a showing of a sub-
stantial state interest in the regulatory scheme. This part of the test was
satisfied in Burger by the strong state interest in deterring auto theft.2"2
O'Halloran and Hill differ on this issue. O'Halloran found strong state
interests in deterring drug use, in protecting the health of the student-
athlete, and in promoting fair competition. 0 3 On the other hand, Hill
found that none of these considerations justified the invasion of pri-
vacy.2" Despite the Hill court's finding, however, the court did not at-
tempt to deny the potential strong governmental interests. The court
contended only that the state had failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support a finding that these interests existed and, further, that these con-
clusions were based on questionable findings of fact.2"5 Hence, it seems
reasonable that both the Hill and O'Halloran courts could find a strong
state interest in the regulation.
As for the second part of the test, the Burger Court found that the
warrantless administrative search furthered the regulatory scheme by de-
terring auto theft, and that a warrantless search was necessary to further
that purpose, since the prerequisite of a warrant could easily have frus-
trated the purpose of the search.20 6 Similarly, in the context of drug test-
ing of student-athletes, the argument could be made that because drugs
pass through a person's system, evidence of their use becomes undetect-
able after a certain period of time. A warrant requirement thus would
frustrate the purpose of the search by giving the student-athletes time to
make sure they were "clean."
To satisfy the third part of the test, the statute must provide a con-
stitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.20 7 The statute must ad-
vise the target of the search that the search is being conducted pursuant
to the regulation and is properly defined in terms of time, place, and
202. Burger, 482 U.S. at 709.
203. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1006-07 (W.D. Wash.),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988)
204. See generally Hill at 11-18.
205. See supra notes 131-171 and accompanying text.
206. Burger, 482 U.S. at 710-11.
207. Id. at 703.
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scope of the inspection.2"8 The Burger Court found this requirement sat-
isfied when the statute stated that inspections would be made "on a regu-
lar basis, .... during usual business hours."2 "9 The inspection would be
made only of vehicle-dismantling and related industries, and the permis-
sible scope of the search covered only the records of the business and any
vehicles or parts of vehicles. 10 This general definition of time, place, and
scope is sufficient to meet the test of a "constitutionally adequate substi-
tute for a warrant." It should be a simple exercise to draft a statute to
meet this broad requirement: such a statute might specify searches on a
"regular basis" or during "usual business hours."
If the California legislature enacted such legislation, it would be dif-
ficult for a state court to strike it down under the United States Constitu-
tion in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Burger. In the view of the
Burger Court, a statute of this kind creates an exception to the warrant
requirement, and thus a search pursuant to such a statute is reasonable.
C. In Which Direction Should the Balance of Interests Tip?
In its final inquiry, the O'Halloran court compared relative weights
of the competing interests. O'Halloran balanced the individual's right to
privacy against the competing interests of stopping or deterring drug
abuse, educating the student-athlete about using drugs, protecting the
health of the student-athlete, and maintaining the fairness and integrity
of college athletics. 211 After finding an invasion of the right to privacy,
Hill looked for a compelling interest to justify the invasion. The interests
addressed by the Hill court were essentially those enumerated in
O'Halloran: stopping or deterring drug use, protecting the health and
safety of the student-athlete, and ensuring fair competition.
Each court weighed privacy expectations against public interest con-
siderations, but the findings of the two courts stand in stark contrast to
each other. This section of the Note will evaluate the differing findings
and the reasons for them, and examine which finding is more rational.
L The Right to Privacy
The O'Halloran court almost conceded an invasion of the right to
privacy, but it examined the extent to which the right had been breached
and weighed that invasion against the competing interests. The Hill
court clearly found an invasion of the right to privacy because of the risk
of media publicity, but did not discuss the degree to which the right had
208. Id.
209. Id. at 711.
210. Id. at 711-12.
211. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1006-07 (W.D. Wash.),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
been invaded.2 12 The Hill court also found an invasion of the right be-
cause a drug test might reveal information about medical treatment the
athlete was receiving and because the athlete might test positive as a re-
sult of legally taking drugs that are on the NCAA's banned list.213 Hill
gave little weight to the provision in the NCAA program that allows the
student-athlete to declare the use of legitimate drugs that may affect the
test results, such as cold or diet medications.2 14 The court also ignored
the fact that the samples and test results are anonymous, identified only
by code number. This code number is broken to reveal the identity of the
student-athlete only after a positive test is returned and confirmed by
additional testing.215 Thus, the invasion of the right to privacy is not as
drastic as Hill would seem to indicate.
The O'Halloran court undertook a more reasonable evaluation of
the invasion of the right. The court acknowledged relevant factors con-
tributing to "a diminished expectation of privacy in the context of a uni-
versity athletic program": an element of communal undress is present in
university athletic programs, but not in other mandatory drug-testing
cases, (i.e. Railway Labor, Shoemaker); and health examinations, that al-
low an amount of viewing and touching among relative strangers that
would be firmly rejected in most other situations, are fairly routine for an
athlete.216 The O'Halloran court did not deny an invasion of the privacy
right, but suggested that the invasion be viewed as one of degree rather
than in simple black and white terms, especially since steps are taken to
ensure anonymity in the testing, and it is only after a positive test is
found that the identity of the athlete is revealed.
2. Competing Interests
The Hill court found that in order for drug testing to pass constitu-
tional muster, it must be supported by a compelling need. The court
found insufficient evidence to support that required compelling need. As
has already been discussed, part of the evidence for that finding was
based on a questionable use of statistics from past NCAA drug-testing
programs.217 The Hill court also examined evidence of the types of drugs
used, and found only scattered use of cocaine and marijuana. Addition-
ally, the court found that "[t]he minimal evidence of drug use is almost
212. Nor did the court discuss the problems associated with a finding that factually accu-
rate reporting by the news media constitutes an invasion of privacy. See supra notes 123-124,
190 and accompanying text.
213. Hill at 10-11.
214. The 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part V, Protocol. See also O'Halloran,
679 F. Supp. at 999.
215. 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
216. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 134-137, 191 and accompanying text.
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entirely limited to anabolic steroid use ... .,28 The court also noted that
there was no good evidence that wrestlers had used diuretics to "make
weight" or to dilute urine to avoid testing positive for other drugs.
21 9
Nevertheless, if diuretics are used to disguise the presence of other
drugs, negative test results could be interpreted as evidence that the di-
uretics work. Presumably the NCAA placed diuretics on the list of
banned substances because the mere presence of diuretics may indicate
an attempt to mask the use of other drugs. On one hand the court ac-
knowledged that one reason the program tests for diuretics is that they
are used in masking the presence of other banned drugs. The court con-
cluded, however, that the absence of positive tests means the athletes are
not using drugs, although such results may indicate only that the stu-
dent-athletes are effectively avoiding being detected, and not whether
drugs are being used.
The court's argument was based on the premise that drug testing
will catch every drug user and that if a person is using drugs, she will test
positive. But the NCAA drug-testing program is not random or unan-
nounced. Since the student-athlete knows she will be tested, it seems
natural that there would not be many positive tests. When drug testing is
announced, the student-athlete obviously has advanced warning and may
take steps to avoid detection of drug use.
Drug testing may cause student-athletes to stop using drugs. Never-
theless, lack of positive test results should not be presumed to be evidence
that the program is ineffective or is not working. As the O'Halloran
court noted, "the program will have a deterrent effect, and ... [s]uch
evidence of the program's success should not be used to demonstrate lack
of need for the program or that the program has no reasonable basis."22 0
Again, the O'Halloran opinion is better reasoned. The Hill court
argued that, because the program does not result in positive tests for the
use of banned drugs, the program is ineffective and unnecessary. 221 Since
the program is aimed at deterring and stopping drug use, however, a lack
of positive test results could easily be interpreted as evidence that the
program is working. The Hill court's reasoning is fallacious because the
goal of the program is to deter drug use and such programs wil have a
natural deterrent effect.222 Thus, an indication of the program's success
is a decrease in the number of positive test results. The court's reasoning
suggests there must be more positive test results in order to show a need
218. Hill at 13.
219. Id. at 13-14. The practice of taking diuretics to dilute urine is commonly known as
"masking." Since the diuretics also work to flush water from the system, evidence of other
drug use is eliminated in the discharge.
220. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd
on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
221. See Hill at 12-13.
222. See O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
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for the program. In essence the court's argument would mean that stu-
dent-athletes must use drugs in the face of announced drug testing, thus
testing positive for banned substances and forfeiting their eligibility, for
the tests to be deemed necessary.
The Hill court found insufficient evidence of drug use and concluded
that college athletes in general do not use drugs, and that drugs therefore
cannot be a threat to the health of the student-athlete. The court stated
that there is no evidence that drug use has caused an athlete to injure
himself or someone else.223 Furthermore, the court found the program
lacking in that it did not protect other areas of student-athlete health. 2 4
The Hill court seemed to suggest that the NCAA should ban the use
of substances, such as cigarettes and alcohol, that are perfectly legal to
purchase and use. While most people would not argue that the use of
cigarettes or alcohol does not pose a health threat, the NCAA cannot
stop a student-athlete from exercising his own free will and freedom of
choice. Similarly, it seems that the court would condition a drug-testing
program in the name of health and safety by requiring the NCAA to
provide for all the health and safety needs of its student-athletes. It
would be unreasonable to charge the NCAA with the responsibility of
vaccinating student-athletes for measles (and presumably requiring the
NCAA to provide any other vaccination or medication the student-ath-
lete might need) simply because the NCAA has undertaken a program to
protect one aspect of a student-athlete's health and safety.225  The
NCAA's program deals with an area of the student-athlete's life that is
shared with the NCAA, specifically, participation in college athletics.22 6
The NCAA should not be penalized for attempting to achieve the worth-
while goal of stopping drug use by making it responsible for the entire
health needs of every student-athlete.227
Although the Hill court found fault with the NCAA program be-
cause it does nothing to stop the most serious drug problem in America,
alcohol abuse,228 the court did not even address the issues of the health
threat posed by the drugs on the NCAA's banned list. O'Halloran found
that "all the drugs which are banned provoke adverse effects and unto-
ward reactions which may be detrimental to a student-athlete's present
223. Hill at 14.
224. See Hill at 15. The court suggested that the NCAA should provide measles vaccina-
tions, or prohibit smoking or the use of alcohol.
225. See, e.g., Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) ("This Court has consistently
recognized that in addressing complex problems a legislature 'may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.'"
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955))).
226. A health-benefit package provided by the NCAA for student-athletes is not an unrea-
sonable proposal. Nevertheless, because of the complexity of development and administration,
consideration of such a proposal is beyond the scope of this analysis.
227. Note, also, that some type of broad health plan is generally provided by most schools.
228. Hill at 15.
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and future health. '229 The issue of whether or not the drugs banned by
the NCAA actually enhance performance is discussed below, but assum-
ing that the drugs on the banned list have absolutely no effect on per-
formance. It strains reason to argue that cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and
the myriad other drugs on the banned list do not threaten the health of
the student-athlete even if it is conceded that the drugs do not affect
performance. While the NCAA's program may not deal with alcohol
abuse, the NCAA should get some credit for attempting to deal with the
abuse of other drugs which may not be as widely used yet pose no less
threat to the health of the student-athlete.
The Hill court specifically found that the NCAA failed to carry its
burden of showing that steroids enhance athletic performance.230 Even
assuming, however, that they have no performance-enhancing effect, the
growing use of steroids would indicate that despite what science may tell
us, athletes believe they enhance performance, and this belief encourages
widespread use.231 The dispute over the performance-enhancing quali-
ties of steroids gives way to questions of adverse health effects. While
available data on these effects is sparse due to the generally covert use of
steroids and the reluctance of doctors to conduct tests due to the ques-
tionable long-term side effects, steroid use has been linked to prostate,
liver, and testicular cancer, shrinkage of the testicles, and sterility.
232
Steroid use is also linked to a changed mental state. It can cause uncon-
trollable fits of aggression and rage followed by extreme states of stress
and anxiety, to the point of creating suicidal tendencies.2 33 The Hill
court is willing to extract a very high price in human pain and suffering
simply because there are no definitive answers to the questions of the
performance enhancement and adverse effects of steroids.
Finally, the Hill court found that despite the fact that promoting
fair competition is a stated goal of the NCAA program, there is no evi-
dence to establish that any of the banned substances actually enhance the
athlete's performance. 234 As previously discussed, the possibility that the
banned substances may not enhance performance seems a weak justifica-
tion for not policing their use since evidence suggests that drugs are used
extensively to enhance performance whether they work or not.235
229. 679 F. Supp. at 1006 (quoting Professor Dugal who testified concerning the need for a
drug-testing program).
230. Hill at 17.
231. Estimates place at one million the number of athletes using steroids in the U.S. alone.
See D. Benjamin, Shame of the Games, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 76.
232. Id. at 77.
233. See Chakin and Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24,
1988, at 82.
234. Hill at 16.
235. See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
The circumstantial evidence with regard to steroid use suggests an
opposite conclusion than that reached by the Hill court. The Olympics
and other major international amateur sporting events routinely test for
banned substances including steroids. One problem with the testing is its
expense, about $100 per test.236 The governing bodies of these interna-
tional sports competitions are willing to invest a rather substantial sum
to test for the presence of drugs that do not enhance performance. Hill
also argued that it has never been "scientifically demonstrated" that im-
provements in strength will translate into enhanced performance.2 3 7 Sci-
entific evidence aside, if talent and technique are equal, the stronger
athlete will prevail. Increases in strength may also compensate for defi-
ciencies in other areas and allow the less talented athlete to prevail.
Physical strength is a significant component of athletic achievement; arti-
ficially enhancing an athlete's strength can give that athlete an unfair
advantage.
Hill also found evidence that drugs such as stimulants not only do
not enhance performance, but may in fact impair performance because of
distractibility, loss of concentration, shaky or tremulous hands, and
jumpiness.238 Nevertheless, the integrity of sports would be jeopardized
as much by impaired performance as by enhanced performance. An ath-
letic event is no less tainted when performance is artificially depressed
than when it is enhanced. The Hill court surely did not mean to imply
that drug use is acceptable ii it has no effect or a detrimental effect on
athletic performance, and becomes unacceptable only at that point at
which athletic performance is enhanced.
Hill further argued that there is no evidence that the use of diuretics
enhances athletic performance.2 39 This argument ignores the suggestion
made by the Hill court itself2' ° and the reality of the situation, that di-
uretics are not taken for their performance-enhancing qualities, but in-
stead to flush water from the athlete's body, thereby reducing the
athlete's weight and enabling him or her to qualify to compete in a par-
ticular weight class.24 Diuretics are also taken to mask the use of other
drugs that may (or may not) enhance performance.24 2 Performance en-
hancement is not the proper inquiry when addressing the use of diuretics.
The O'Halloran court addressed the public perception of college
athletics while the Hill court was silent on the issue. The O'Halloran
court followed the lead of the court in Shoemaker, which noted that
"[p]ublic confidence forms the foundation for the success of an industry
236. D. Benjamin, Shame of the Games, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 77.
237. Hill at 16.
238. Id at 17.
239. Id
240. Id at 13-14.
241. D. Benjamin, Shame of the Games, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 75.
242. Id.
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based on wagering. 24 3 While the success of college athletics is not based
on wagering, it is axiomatic that an overall aura of fairness determines
how well the public will receive a given sport. Enthusiasm will be low if
the public perceives that the winner of a contest will be the one with the
best pharmacist. Also, the success of the NCAA sports program will
indirectly turn on the public's perception of fairness. For example, a vast
majority of the NCAA's funding comes from revenues generated from
selling television commercial time during the NCAA Final-Four Basket-
ball Tournament. This advertising time will not command a high price if
no one will turn on the game because of public perception that the game
lacks integrity.
V. Conclusion
The battle lines have been drawn in the war on drug testing. It is
being fought in two forums, the state and federal courts. Clearly the
NCAA has the upper hand in this war. The O'Halloran case demon-
strates that the federal courts are defeating constitutional challenges on
two fronts. Student-athlete plaintiffs have failed to make either of the
necessary showings to establish a federal case: that NCAA action consti-
tutes "state action," 2' or that they have been deprived of their constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy.245
Hill is an example of a success story in the student-athletes' war on
drug testing. The key to Hill lies in the more extensive protection of the
right to privacy granted by the California Constitution.246 Under the
California Constitution, as demonstrated by Hill, the student-athlete can
win an injunction against NCAA drug testing. 24 7
The question remains whether the battle lines are entrenched or
whether we can expect some shifting of the fronts. As this Note argues,
notwithstanding the greater constitutional protection afforded by the
California Constitution, the arguments that are propounded in the fed-
eral forum seem to be delivered from a firmer logical and factual basis.
248
In addition, it now appears that the student-athletes will have no federal
forum after the holding in Tarkanian 249 establishing that the NCAA is
not a state actor. Though Hill constitutes a setback to the NCAA, time
will tell whether it marks a changing of the guard or, as is more likely, if
243. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3rd Cir. 1986).
244. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 211-243 and accompanying text.
249. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 464 (1989).
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it is simply an unexpected pocket of resistance that will soon be over-
whelmed by the forces fighting the war on drugs.
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